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This is the third of five country case studies on income 
inequality, and investigates the impact of financial 
liberalization and the rise of financial rents on income 
inequality in Turkey. The chapter has five sections: 
Introduction; Indicators of Income Distribution: The Evidence
—a broad overview, and evidence on the patterns of income 
distribution in Turkey over the last three decades; 
Macroeconomic Adjustment under Financial Liberalization and 
the Rise of Financial Rents—a discussion of the evolution of 
functional categories of income that includes an account of the 
macroeconomic adjustment; The Rising Fiscal Gap and the 
Role of the State in Regulating the Distributional Structure—a 
detailed analysis of the rise in public sector deficits and the 
distributive consequences of the widening fiscal gap; and 
Concluding Comments and Overall Assessment. Sect. 3 looks 
at the inherent tensions caused by the macroeconomic 
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disequilibria embodied in the process of integration with world 
markets under conditions of a poorly supervised banking 
system and underdeveloped and fragile domestic asset 
markets; here, it is found to be analytically convenient to 
decompose the path of Turkish liberalization after 1980 into 
two major subperiods partitioned by the strategic step of 
capital account deregulation—which took place in 1989 and 
was completed by the full integration of the domestic market 
into global financial markets. This section also studies the 
patterns of the wage cycle and productivity growth using 
quantitative filtering techniques, and reports on the 
disassociation of labour remunerations from the productivity 
gains in the real sphere of the economy.
Keywords:   banking system, capital account deregulation, capital accounts, case 
studies, deregulation, domestic asset markets, financial liberalization, financial 
rents, Fiscal Gap, income, Income Distribution, income inequality, inequality, 
integration with world markets, labour remuneration, liberalization, 
Macroeconomic Adjustment, productivity gains, productivity growth, public 
sector deficits, Turkey, wage cycle
14.1. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have witnessed a fundamental change in 
the development strategy of most developing economies 
towards domestic and external liberalization. More recently, 
however, renewed attention has been placed on the adverse 
consequences of such public policy changes on income 
equality and poverty alleviation. United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) 1997 Trade and 
Development Report , for instance, reveals that, over a sample 
of 124 countries accounting for 93.6 per cent of the world 
population, the income share of the richest one-fifth of the 
world population rose from 69 per cent in 1965 to over 83 per 
cent in 1990 (UNCTAD 1997 : 81). Likewise, the income gap 
between the richest and the poorest quintiles of the world 
population widened. The ratio of the average per capita gross 
national product (GNP) of the richest to the poorest quintile 
was 31:1 in 1965 but had risen to 60:1 by 1990. Given this 
evidence, the UNCTAD report presents the following stylized 
facts about development and income (in)equality during the 
post-1970 evolution of the global world economy (UNCTAD 
1997 : 65). First, taken as a whole, the world economy is 
growing too slowly to alleviate poverty. Second, finance has 
been gaining over industry, and rentiers over investors. 
Similarly, capital has gained in comparison to labour, and the 
share of profits has risen within the functional distribution of 
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income. And finally, the middle class has been under 
significant pressure as labour markets have become 
marginalized and the existing wage inequalities between 
skilled and unskilled labour have intensified.
While the factors behind these changes constitute the topic of 
active debate, 1 they are acknowledged to be conceptually part 
of a broader set of developments of the world economy loosely 
seen as constituting the process of globalization. This process 
accelerated during the 1970s with the advent of the 
technological innovations in the  (p.356) electronics and 
telecommunications industries. From the point of view of 
economic relations, the process of globalization requires two 
major policy changes: (a) the liberalization of domestic 
commodity and financial markets (the so-called ‘structural 
adjustment’), and (b) the elimination of all administrative and 
regulatory norms hindering the free movement of goods and 
international capital flows. In this sense, economic 
globalization considers the profitability of capital as the sole 
objective of economic rationality and labels all kinds of 
national regulations which limit the owners of capital in their 
quest for maximization of profit as ‘irrational’ or ‘backward 
ideology’ (Bourdieu 1998 ).
As a result, the international capital benefiting from the 
integration of world commodity and financial markets has two 
strategic targets. First, the reduction of the regulatory powers 
of national states, and second, the weakening of labour's 
already limited legal rights to collective bargaining and 
unionization. Thus, in order to sanctify the power of unfettered 
market forces in the name of economic efficiency, this ‘infernal 
machine’ requires the elimination of all administrative or 
political barriers which limit the profitability of private capital 
and necessitates ‘a programme for destroying collective 
structures which may impede the pure market logic’ (Bourdieu
1998 ). The terms ‘globalization’ and ‘financial deregulation’ 
do, in fact, reflect the ideological underpinnings of these 
overall processes. It is the purpose of this study to investigate 
and assess the impact of financial rents on income distribution 
and the overall marginalization of labour incomes in the 
post-1980 Turkish economy.
Turkey initiated its long process of integration in world 
commodity and financial markets with the 1980 structural 
adjustment reforms implemented under the auspices of the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Since 
its early inception, the Turkish adjustment programme was 
hailed as a model by the orthodox international community, 
and it was supported by generous financial assistance through 
structural adjustment loans, debt relief, and technical aid. 2
Currently, the Turkish economy can be said to be operating 
under conditions of a truly open economy: a macroeconomic 
environment in which its capital account is completely 
liberalized and the process of financial deregulation is 
completed. In this setting, many of the instruments of macro 
and fiscal control have been transformed, and the constraints 
of macroequilibrium have undergone major structural change.
3 Concurrently, the domestic economy has witnessed drastic 
changes in the modes of surplus creation and extraction and in 
the interplay of distribution and accumulation.
The chapter is organized into five sections. The next section 
gives a broad overview and presents evidence on the patterns 
of income distribution in Turkey over the last  (p.357) three 
decades. Section 14.3 turns to the evolution of functional 
categories of income and offers a panorama of the 
macroeconomic adjustments under post-financial liberalization 
and the rise of financial rents. Here, of particular importance, 
is the investigation of the inherent tensions caused by the 
macroeconomic disequilibria embodied in the process of 
integration with world markets under conditions of a poorly 
supervised banking system and underdeveloped and fragile 
domestic asset markets. Thus, it is found to be analytically 
convenient to decompose the path of Turkish liberalization 
after 1980 into two major subperiods partitioned by the 
strategic step of capital account deregulation which took place 
in 1989 and was completed by the full integration of the 
domestic market in global financial markets. The section 
further studies the patterns of the wage cycle and productivity 
growth using quantitative filtering techniques, and it reports 
on the disassociation of labour remunerations from the 
productivity gains in the real sphere of the economy. Section 
14.4 provides a detailed analysis of the rise in public sector 
deficits and the distributive consequences of the widening 
fiscal gap. Section 14.5 summarizes and concludes.
14.2. INDICATORS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION: THE 
EVIDENCE
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Turkey is known to suffer from one of the most skewed income 
distributions among countries at a comparable level of 
development. Partly fuelled by the legacy of prolonged import-
substitutionist growth patterns, with excessive quota rents and 
an oligopolistic industrial and banking structure, the economy 
suffers further from a relatively stagnant and overpopulated 
agricultural sector, with loose linkages to domestic industry, 
high rates of immigration due to both economic and political 
pressures, and unequal opportunities to access education.
With the advent in 1980 of reforms for openness that aimed at 
commodity trade liberalization and then, in 1989, with the 
completion of this through financial liberalization, there were 
renewed orthodox expectations of more equitable forms of 
distribution of the national product, since, given the signals of 
efficiency (world) prices, it was thought that import-quota 
rents would be dissipated and the domestic structure of 
production would be transformed. It was further argued that, 
as labour-intensive domestic industries shifted towards export 
markets, the remuneration of labour would increase in real 
terms. These orthodox prescriptions failed to function, 
however, as the economy witnessed sharp changes in the 
underlying economic polity, with the emergence and 
administration of new modes and mechanisms of surplus 
extraction throughout the course of liberalization. First and 
foremost, the proliberal stance and the integration of the 
domestic economy with world markets did not lead to a more 
competitive environment in domestic industry; on the contrary, 
the concentration rates in most outward-oriented sectors such 
as food processing, cement, glass production, and ceramics 
rose sharply. Furthermore, the financing behaviour of 
corporations did not show significant change, and the banking 
sector became increasingly disassociated from credit financing 
and intermediation and evolved towards the financing of the 
securitization of the domestic debt.
 (p.358) The new outward orientation also opened fresh 
avenues for wealth accumulation based on a renewed form of 
rent-seeking, this time towards export promotion subsidies 
and grants provided by the government. Commercial policies 
became the leading mechanism for squeezing domestic 
absorption capacity to generate an exportable surplus for 
export-oriented manufacturing capital. This exportable surplus 
was to be obtained through the generation of excess supply by 
reducing effective domestic demand. This, in turn, 
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necessitated the suppression of wage incomes. This was in 
stark contrast with the dual role of wages under the import-
substitutionist phase both as a cost element and as a source of 
effective demand. Under the new export orientation, however, 
as the sources of effective demand would be expected to 
emerge not from the home market, but from the external 
economy, wages came to be regarded only as a cost item 
which needed to be minimized.
Thus, at a more general level, the post-1980 integration 
process fostered new, intense distributive tensions as the 
share of non-wage income in national product rose, the 
marginalization of labour deepened, the existing wage 
inequalities between skilled and unskilled labour intensified, 
and the access to social safety nets became increasingly 
difficult. All of these conditions favoured more adverse 
consequences in terms of the condition of the poor. Against 
this evidence on the functional categories of income 
distribution, there are serious problems in the documentation 
of these processes as regards the size levels of incomes. 
Despite the availability of official and independent studies on 
the size distribution of incomes during the critical years of 
macroeconomic adjustment, direct comparisons are quite hard 
to make, as the studies have been subject to significant 
changes in both coverage and design over the years. Even so, 
it might be useful to lay down the existing evidence in its 
entirety and caution the reader against strong conclusions. 
Table 14.1 summarizes the available dataset from studies on 
the size distribution of income in Turkey over the last three 
decades.
Over the broad time horizon, the available Gini coefficients 
seem to show an overall tendency for the improvement of 
income distribution in the 1970s, followed by a worsening 
after the 1980s (on this, see Chapter 2 ). The rise in the 
income share of the richest
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Table 14.1. Summary of research on the size distribution of income (percentage of income)
% of 
households
SPO (1963) Bulutay et al . 
(1968)




SIS ( 1987 ) SIS ( 1994 )
1. 20 4.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 6.3 5.2 4.9
2. 20 8.5 7.0 8.0 11.1 12.0 9.6 8.6
3. 20 11.5 10.0 12.5 14.4 13.0 14.1 12.6
4. 20 18.5 20.0 19.5 18.7 21.0 21.1 19.0
5. 20 57.0 60.0 56.5 52.2 47.0 49.9 54.9
Gini coefficient 0.55 0.56 0.51 0.47 0.40 0.43 0.49
Note : Reference year in parentheses.
Sources : SPO ( 1973 ); SIS ( 1987 , 1994 ); Bulutay et al . ( 1971 ).
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 (p.359)
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Table 14.2. Comparison of SIS 1987 versus 1994 surveys of income distribution (percentage of income)
% of households 1987 1994
Turkey Urban Rural Turkey Urban Rural
1. 10 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0
2. 10 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.9 3.6
3. 10 4.3 4.2 4.4 3.9 3.7 4.6
4. 10 5.3 5.1 5.6 4.8 4.5 5.6
5. 10 6.4 6.1 6.8 5.7 5.4 6.7
6. 10 7.7 7.5 8.2 6.9 6.5 8.1
7. 10 9.4 9.2 9.8 8.4 7.9 9.7
8. 10 11.8 11.6 12.2 10.6 10.0 12.1
9. 10 15.9 15.9 16.3 14.4 13.6 16.2
10. 10 34.0 35.0 31.6 40.5 43.6 31.5
Gini coefficient 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.41
Source : SIS ( 1987 , 1994 ).
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quintile seems to be a concomitant development, along with the fall 
of the share of the poorest quintile over the post-1978 time horizon. 
One becomes more confident in this assessment if attention is 
focused only on the latest two surveys conducted by the State 
Institute of Statistics (SIS 1987 , 1994 ). It is clear that, over the 
1987–94 period, the SIS data suggest an expansion of the richest 
quintile at the expense of the other groups, coupled with an overall 
rise of the Gini index. Given the SIS data, Table 14.2 presents a 
more detailed assessment of the findings, tabulated at 10 
percentage intervals across rural versus urban household income 
categories.
The overall message of the 1987 and 1994 surveys is that, 
while the income shares of all nine income groups declined 
over the period, the share of the richest 10 percentile 
increased. Within the economy-wide average, the richest 10 
percentile raised its share by 6.5 percentage points, from 34 
to 40.5 per cent. The polarization of income distribution is 
more acute in urban households in comparison with the rural 
sector. The rural economy's Gini coefficient is mostly stable at 
0.41, and the worsening of the urban income distribution 
seems to account for almost all of the economy-wide 
skewedness in income. In fact, with a Gini coefficient of above 
50 per cent in urban centres, the lowest 20 per cent quintile is 
calculated to receive only 4.8 per cent of national income, in 
contrast with the share of the richest quintile, which reaches 
to 57.2 per cent.
The polarization of income is more visible if the comparison is 
made using purchasing power parity US dollars at constant 
prices. Such an exercise conducted on the SIS data reveals 
that the richest quintile consists of 13.9 million individuals 
with an average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of 
$9,878. The per capita income of the top 5 percentile, on the 
other hand, reaches $22,344 in constant 1997 prices (Table 
14.3 ). Comparing these figures with those for the lowest 
quintile, the extent of the  (p.360)
Table 14.3. Average income, richest and poorest 
quintiles, 1997 (US$)







The richest 20 percentile
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First 5 3,406,030 12,927 22,344
Second 5 3,517,388 4,196 7,252
Third 5 3,562,951 3,193 5,519




The lowest 20 percentile
First 5 3,013,322 780 1,349
Second 5 2,926,201 694 1,200
Third 5 2,796,454 597 1,032




Source : SIS ( 1994 ).
income gap becomes more apparent: the lowest 20 percentile 
consists of 10.9 million individuals, with an average income of only 
$1119 per head. Among this group, 2.15 million individuals (the 
poorest 5 per cent) are known to have an income per capita of only 
$803.
Another facet of this income concentration in the urban sector 
is the increased wage gap between the skilled/organized and 
the unskilled/marginal segments of the labour force. Köse and 
Yeldan ( 1998 ) categorize ‘informal/marginal’ labour as that 
part of the employed labour force which is not officially 
registered for any social security coverage and also is not 
entitled under the ‘self employed or employer’ status. Based 
on the State Institute of Statistics Household Labour Survey 
data, they report that the ratio of marginal labour to total 
employment in industry increased from 41 per cent in 1980 to 
49 per cent in 1994 and stabilized at around 44 per cent after 
1995. This form of employment was found to be very extensive 
in traditional sectors like food processing, textiles and 
clothing, wood and furniture, and metal products, where small 
enterprises have greater importance.
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Wage data strongly suggest that the substantial improvement 
in average wages during 1989–93 was almost totally due to 
what was happening in the organized/formal sector. Wage 
gaps between large/small and public/private enterprises 
widened significantly and exceeded the magnitude of the early 
1980s. In particular, highly organized mining and electricity/
gas workers improved their relative economic positions 
significantly. In comparison to averages in manufacturing, 
wages in the clothing industry, on the other hand, eroded by 
20 percentage points over the same period, falling below the 
1981 level at the start of the liberalization programme 
(Yentürk 1997 ; Köse and Yeldan 1998 ; Boratav et al . 2000 ). 
Given the extent of polarization indicated by these numbers, it 
is clear that ‘traditional’ explanations of income inequality, 
such as unequal access to education, unequal distribution of 
assets and land concentration,  (p.361) and the urban-bias do 
not suffice to provide a coherent portrait of the 
macroeconomic processes which have given rise to the 
outcome (see Chapter 1 ).
Even though easy generalizations can be misleading, one may 
nevertheless associate the rising income inequality with the 
broad tendency towards the marginalization of labour due to 
informal industrial relations, advances in new technologies 
which favour skill-intensive production patterns, and an 
unequivocal trend towards the disassociation of the financial 
sector from the productive sphere of the economy and the 
concomitant expansion of financial rents. A careful analysis 
along these lines necessitates a shift of focus towards the 
functional categories of income and the underlying processes 
of macro adjustment. The next section turns to these issues.
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14.3. MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT UNDER 
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND THE RISE OF 
FINANCIAL RENTS
The Turkish economy experienced two distinct phases along 
the post-1980 adjustment path. The first covers broadly the 
period 1981–8, and its main characteristic is structural 
adjustment with export promotion, albeit under a foreign 
exchange system of regulated foreign capital inflows. During 
this period, integration in global markets was achieved mainly 
through commodity trade liberalization. More importantly, 
both the exchange rate and direct export subsidies were the 
main instruments for the promotion of exports and the pursuit 
of macroeconomic stability. The macroeconomic phases of the 
post-1980 Turkish economy are sketched in Table 14.4 . The 
table illustrates the various mechanisms of adjustment that 
have taken place in the spheres of production, distribution, 
and internationalization.
Three major cycles of adjustment–growth–recession/crisis are 
evident in Table 14.4 . First is the cycle of export orientation, 
1981–7, followed by the recession of 1988. The second cycle, 
1989–93, was generated by foreign capital inflows following 
the financial deregulation in 1989 and came to an end with the 
eruption of the 1994 financial crisis. Lastly, the post-1995 
growth was short-circuited by the contagion of the East Asian 
and Russian crises after 1998. The underlying mode of 
adjustment in the 1980s was the export orientation of 
manufacturing industries. During the decade, export revenues 
increased at an annual rate of 15 per cent, and GNP rose per 
annum by 4.2 per cent in 1981–2 and by 6.5 per cent between 
1983 and 1987. The depreciation of the currency exceeded the 
rate of domestic inflation for purposes of export promotion and 
attaining foreign balances, and the Turkish lira was caught in 
a declining trend in real terms until 1989.
Yet, the underlying feature of the 1981–8 period was the 
suppression of wages in an attempt to lower production costs 
and squeeze domestic absorption capacity. Indeed, one of the 
first measures of the military regime of 1980 was to regulate 
the labour market through political authoritarianism and the 
depoliticization and demobilization of the labour force (Cizre-
Sakallioglu 1991 ; Yeldan 1995 ). With the imposition of the 
1982 Constitution and new articles in the 1983 Labour Code, 
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the position of wage labour vis-à-vis capital commenced to 
erode severely throughout the decade.  (p.362)
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1981–2 1983–7 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.I a
I. Production and accumulation (real rate of growth, %)




25.3 12.3 12.6 1.7 19.4 0.9 4.3 35.0 −9.1 16.9 12.1 11.9 −6.7 −6.7
Public 
sector





−5.1 2.1 −4.8 −14.2 41.6 −4.8 1.1 16.1 −4.7 15.2 2.9 −3.4 −4.8
As % of GDP
Saving
s
17.7 19.5 27.2 22.1 22.0 21.4 21.6 22.7 23.1 22.1 20.0 21.3 21.2
Invest
ment
18.3 20.9 26.1 22.5 22.6 23.7 23.4 26.3 24.5 24.0 25.0 25.3 25.6
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1981–2 1983–7 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.I a











2.4 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.8 4.6 6.0 6.2 9.0 7.7 10.9









45.0 39.7 66.0 49.0 23.0 60.0 65.0 59.0 170.0 54.0 77.0 78.0 76.0 54.7
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27.1 37.8 44.8 38.8 32.5 33.6 35.2 37.7 49.6 42.8 46.1 47.8 51.7
( a) Annual % rate of change from the same period of the previous year.
( b) According to the $1.5 +1 euro basket.
( c) Annual average compounded interest rate on government debt instruments deflated by the CPI.
( d) Private manufacturing labour data pertain to enterprises employing 10 or more workers.
( e) Annual growth rate in manufacturing exports (millions, $).
( f) Inclusive of the luggage trade after 1996.
Sources : State Planning Organization and Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade and Treasury data on main economic indicators and 
State Institute of Statistics manufacturing industry surveys.
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 (p.363)  (p.364) As soon as it assumed power, the military 
government shut down the major labour union confederations, and 
trade unions were barred from engaging in political activity and 
establishing formal and informal links with political parties. With 
the new Labour Code of 1983, the right to strike was severely 
restricted and was limited only to collective bargaining disputes. 
Even then, a strike could be prohibited or postponed, and any 
dispute could be settled from the outside by a newly formed body 
called the Supreme Board of Arbitration. Through this body, the 
state exercised strict control and supervision over labour relations 
and regulated the evolution of wage demands effectively. 
Consequently, the share of wage labour in private manufacturing 
value added receded from 30 per cent to 20 per cent and in public 
manufacturing from 27 per cent to 15 per cent between 1980 and 
1988. In this process, the average mark-up rate (profit margins) in 
private manufacturing increased from 31 per cent to 38 per cent 
(Table 14.4 ).
The other side of this distributional shift was the rise in 
financial rents. With the advent of the deregulation of 
domestic financial markets and the liberalization of the capital 
account, the Turkish economy had completed its integration 
with global financial markets by 1989. In this setting, the 
central bank lost its overall control over the exchange rate and 
the interest rate as instruments of independent policy-making, 
as these practically turned into exogenous parameters set by 
the chaotic changes in financial arbitrage in global markets.
Financial liberalization was expected to achieve a more 
efficient and flexible financial system capable of converting 
national savings into productive investments at the lowest 
cost. Contrary to what was expected, however, the reforms 
were not accompanied by any significant change in the 
financing behaviour of corporations and did not lead to lower 
investment costs (Akyüz 1990 ). The state maintained its 
dominance in both commodity and asset markets through its 
complex system of price and fiscal incentives. The real rate of 
interest, in fact, rose to unprecedented levels, and domestic 
asset markets, impacted by sudden changes in speculative 
foreign capital flows, became volatile and uncertain.
Table 14.5 documents the distributional consequences of the 
post-1980 financial deregulation. The share of interest income 
in total domestic income rose from close to zero in 1980 to 
15.2 per cent by 1998, a figure similar to the total value added 
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of agriculture—a sector that employs 45 per cent of the 
civilian labour force.
From a longer time perspective, the overall decline of 
agricultural and wage income is phenomenal. The share of 
agricultural income has been reduced by almost half in the 
course of the last three decades. The wage cycle, on the other 
hand, displayed a rising trend in the 1970s and followed a 
declining course during the outward orientation of the 
domestic economy in the 1980s. The income share of non-
agricultural wages reached its lowest level in 1986 at 17.1 per 
cent from the peak of 36.8 per cent realized in 1977. A fall of 
such magnitude clearly reflected the faltering employment 
response of domestic industry to significant reductions in real 
wages. The implication is that the scope for capital–labour 
substitution has been greatly limited in the productive sectors 
of the Turkish economy (Celasun 1989 : 20). Given this 
background, it would be illuminating to trace out the dynamics 
of the real earnings of wage labour  (p.365)
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1970 100.00 31.08 68.92 31.15 37.77
1971 100.00 31.31 68.69 31.33 37.36
1972 100.00 30.32 69.68 31.57 38.11
1973 100.00 29.13 70.87 31.56 39.31
1974 100.00 30.20 69.80 29.77 40.03
1975 100.00 30.76 69.24 31.51 37.73
1976 100.00 31.28 68.72 33.11 35.61
1977 100.00 29.12 70.88 36.81 34.07
1978 100.00 26.66 73.34 35.19 38.15
1979 100.00 24.33 75.67 32.79 42.88
1980 100.00 27.51 72.49 25.27 14.60 10.67 47.22 8.97 0.73 37.52
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1981 100.00 25.27 74.73 22.28 11.86 10.42 52.45 8.04 3.54 40.87
1982 100.00 23.52 76.48 20.09 10.17 9.92 56.39 8.13 5.35 42.91
1983 100.00 22.14 77.86 22.02 10.98 11.04 55.84 8.15 5.41 42.28
1984 100.00 22.43 77.57 19.37 9.58 9.79 58.20 7.56 7.68 42.96
1985 100.00 21.17 78.83 17.40 8.49 8.91 61.43 7.78 6.74 46.91
1986 100.00 21.03 78.97 17.08 8.32 8.76 61.89 7.24 7.01 47.64
1987 100.00 19.19 80.81 20.39 9.43 10.96 60.42 6.26 7.80 46.36
1988 100.00 18.58 81.42 20.91 9.10 11.81 60.51 4.80 8.89 46.82
1989 100.00 18.20 81.80 24.07 12.37 11.70 57.73 3.92 5.90 47.91
1990 100.00 19.07 80.93 28.11 15.02 13.09 52.82 3.39 5.79 43.64
1991 100.00 16.35 83.65 33.78 18.27 15.51 49.87 3.76 8.44 37.67
1992 100.00 15.97 84.03 34.42 19.43 14.99 49.61 3.84 7.95 37.82
1993 100.00 16.77 83.23 33.29 19.10 14.19 49.94 3.38 6.97 39.59
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1994 100.00 16.70 83.30 27.50 15.47 12.03 55.80 3.23 8.62 43.95
1995 100.00 17.18 82.82 24.56 12.68 11.88 58.26 3.24 11.61 43.41
1996 100.00 18.34 81.66 26.81 12.28 14.53 54.85 3.08 14.71 37.06
1997 100.00 15.73 84.27 29.45 13.50 15.95 54.82 3.10 14.40 37.32
1998 100.00 18.51 81.49 27.44 13.83 13.61 54.05 3.38 15.17 35.50
Sources : 1970–9, Ozmucur ( 1986 ); 1980–98, Temel and associates (1999).
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against (labour) productivity growth over an extended time horizon. 
In what follows, recent advances in the business cycle literature 
are employed, and the variations in the average product of labour 
and the real wage rate in Turkish industry are decomposed to 
obtain the underlying long-term trends. Hodrick–Prescott ( 1980 ) 
filtering methods are used to separate out the cyclical variations in 
productivity growth and wage rates from their respective historical 
trends. This exercise enables us to isolate the underlying trend 
paths of the two variables and to make inferences about the 
evolution of the wage cycle against the long-term productivity 
patterns in Turkish industry.
Data for our analysis come from the annual manufacturing 
industry surveys reported by the State Institute of Statistics. 
For the ‘wage rate’ series, ‘total wage earnings’ divided by 
‘total workers engaged in production’ are used. The average 
labour  (p.366)
Figure 14.1.  Trends in (a) real average 
labour productivity and (b) real wages in 
Turkish manufacturing, 1950–96
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product is derived by dividing ‘total value added’ by the same 
labour employment magnitude. Both series are deflated by the 
wholesale price index and are filtered in logarithmic form. The 
exercise covers the extended time frame, 1950–96. The results of 
the filter are portrayed in Figs. 14.1(a) and 14.1(b) . The units on 
the y -axis are in real  (p.367) 1963 TL in log scale. In Fig. 14.1(a) , 
we observe the historical long-term trend of the real average 
labour product in Turkish manufacturing. The trend has a secular 
upward slope, with an average rate of annual growth of 3.8 per 
cent for the whole time horizon (1950–96). This is to be contrasted 
with the trend in the real wage rate portrayed in Fig. 14.1(b) . The 
trend in real wages fluctuates along an increasing path until the 
mid-1970s, enters a deceleration between 1980 and 1988, and 
recovers after 1989. The observed recovery in the real wage is 
clearly the result of post-1989 populism, which enabled sharp 
increases in real wages between 1989 and 1993, as outlined in 
Section 14.4 . On this record of events, it seems plausible to argue 
that the post-1989 upswing in manufacturing real wages was, in 
fact, in line with the real average product of labour as far as the 
long-term trends of the two series are concerned. 4
Consequently, the fluctuations in the real wage trend 
document the periodization of the overall political cycle 
affecting Turkish labour markets. The fundamental 
characteristic of this cycle is that it discloses a relatively weak 
connection between wage remunerations and labour 
productivity in manufacturing industries. The trend path of 
real wages clearly signals a break following 1979/80. This is 
the era when the domestic economy was subjected to a new 
transformation in terms of foreign competition and integration 
with global commodity and asset markets. The ongoing wage 
suppression as manifested by the downswing in the wage cycle 
indicates that the adjustments in labour markets had served as 
one of the main mechanisms to bring forth this transformation. 
Implemented under a military rule which imposed severe 
restrictions through the Labour Code on collective bargaining 
and unionization, the cost savings on wage labour were 
instrumental in extracting an economic surplus which, in turn, 
was oriented towards export markets via a generous export 
subsidization programme.
Reading from a different perspective, the sharp contrast in the 
trend in labour productivity against real wage earnings 
following the 1980 transformation clearly displays the extent 
of disassociation between the productive sphere of the 
domestic economy and its indigenous processes of 
accumulation and distribution. As the internationalization of 
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commodity and financial markets intensified, the links 
between the processes of savings generation and the 
productive use of these funds for capital accumulation—the so-
called ‘process of intermediation’—were severed. With the 
complete deregulation of financial transactions and the 
consequent ascendancy of finance over industry, international 
capital was able to assume a dominant role so as to act as the 
sole arbiter, aiming at immediate financial gain rather than at 
long-term economic development and sustainable growth. As 
this unbalanced structure failed to generate the necessary 
accumulation patterns to achieve sustained growth, the 
impetus for it was exhausted by the end of the decade. The 
artificial growth path generated through wage suppression 
and price subsidies reached its economic and political limits 
by 1988. As summarized in Table 14.4 , all economic indicators 
for 1988 signal a stagflationary macro environment. The rate 
of GDP growth was only 2.1 per cent, the rate of growth of 
fixed investments was negative, and the inflation rate 
accelerated to 75 per cent. Furthermore, the real exchange 
rate had started to appreciate for the first time since the 
inception of export orientation.
 (p.368) Commensurate with these events, we observe real 
wage earnings entering a period of recovery following the 
gains of the union movement and also the new wave of 
populist pressures. As can be seen from the data in Table 
14.4 , real wages in public manufacturing increased by 47.5 
per cent in 1988 and then again by 37.1 per cent in 1991. 
Similar trends were observed in the private manufacturing 
sector as real wage costs increased by 16.1 per cent in 1989, 
22.2 per cent in 1990, and 20.2 per cent in 1991. 
Furthermore, the rural economy witnessed a significant 
improvement in its terms of trade vis-à-vis the rest of the 
economy. This occurred despite an ongoing process of 
worsening agricultural terms of trade in world markets, a 
contrasting signal in favour of the rural economy. Finally, 
beginning in 1989, there was a major shift in public 
expenditure towards more socially desirable activities. An 
overall increase in both the share and the level of public 
salaries and investments in social infrastructure enabled the 
working masses to attain improved living standards.
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14.4. THE RISING FISCAL GAP AND THE ROLE OF THE 
STATE IN REGULATING THE DISTRIBUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE
The post-1990 balances in the public sector record an 
unprecedented rise in the fiscal gap. In contrast, post-1988 
populism could evidently be financed by taxing capital 
incomes and moving towards a fairer tax burden for the 
working classes. Yet, the strategic preference of the state was 
the maintenance of its favourable stance towards the evasion 
of taxable capital incomes and towards surplus transfer 
because of a lax attitude towards so-called ‘unrecorded private 
transactions’. Consequently, the state apparatus turned into a 
bastion of privilege as it assumed a regulatory role in the 
creation and absorption of the economic surplus, and fiscal 
balances took the major brunt of adjustment. The main 
macroeconomic policy response to increased wage costs and 
the shift in the rural terms of trade involved the rapid 
widening of the fiscal gap and support for the profitability of 
private capital. As a major indicator of the (functional) 
distribution of income, for instance, profit margins mark-up 
rate maintained a rising trend, and, despite the severe jump in 
real wage costs, reached 47 per cent in 1994, up from 33.5 per 
cent in 1989. Simultaneous to this development was the rapid 
rise of the borrowing requirement of the public sector, as the 
ratio of the PSBR to GDP climbed to 10.3 per cent in 1991 and 
12.1 per cent in 1993 (Table 14.4 ).
Given all this, the widening fiscal deficit and the 
macroeconomic disequilibria it generated clearly should be 
understood in the context of the historical role of the state in 
sustaining capital incomes against the faltering performance 
of export-led growth patterns along with rapid increases in the 
costs of wage labour. The fiscal deficit of the Turkish state in 
the early 1990s does not necessarily imply a chronic problem 
of bureaucratic mismanagement, but is a reflection of the 
administrative and socio-economic policies on the part of the 
public sector that were deemed necessary to sustain the 
generation of an economic surplus for private capital. The 
state used its tax and subsidy policies as well as the prices of 
the goods produced by state enterprises as strategic 
instruments to this end and financed its fiscal deficits via 
forced savings by  (p.369) way of price inflation and 
increased securitization of domestic debt through short-term 
capital inflows. 5 With this approach, however, the stock of 
securitized domestic debt rose almost fourfold in the relatively 
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short time span of a decade, from about 6 per cent of GNP in 
1989, just when the liberalization of the capital account was 
completed, to 22 per cent in 1998.
A key characteristic of the Turkish domestic debt was its 
short-term maturity. As a ratio of the stock of existing debt, 
annual cumulative domestic borrowings increased over the 
1990s and reached 103 per cent in 1993, indicating that each 
year the state had to resort to new borrowing which exceeded 
the stock of debt already accumulated. In 1996, this ratio 
reached 163.5 per cent. Even though the ratio seems to have 
declined over 1997, provisional indicators for 1998 and 1999 
reveal that it again surpassed the 100 per cent threshold. 6
Thus, the public sector has been trapped in a short-term debt 
spiral, a phenomenon called ‘Ponzi-financing’. Under these 
conditions, and given the fragility of the domestic asset 
markets, real interest rates rose to very high levels and, as a 
result, interest payments on the public debt rose from 2 per 
cent of GNP in 1990 to 4.6 per cent in 1993 and 14.1 per cent 
by the end of 1999.
On the other hand, the obligation to generate a surplus in the 
primary budget led to severe retrenchment in the remaining 
public expenditure items. The major brunt of the adjustment 
fell on public investment expenditure that was reduced to only 
4.6 per cent of total budgetary outlays by the third quarter of 
1998. By comparison, the interest payments on the domestic 
debt reached 1010 per cent of public investments and 481 per 
cent of social security transfers in the same year. In other 
words, the Turkish central budget lost in the 1990s all its 
function as an instrument of social infrastructure development 
and economic growth, and was transformed into a tool of 
financial sector development, regulating the distribution of the 
economic surplus in the domestic asset market in ways which 
favour the financial rentiers and private capital owners.
The extent of this regulatory role can be more clearly grasped 
when account is taken of the amount of income taxes 
generated by capital incomes (Fig. 14.2 ). By comparing the 
interest costs of the state and the tax earnings from capital 
incomes, one can see the extent of the transfer accruing to the 
rentier classes through the debt management operations of 
the treasury. As a ratio of GNP, interest payments on domestic 
debt had exceeded 10 per cent by the end of the decade. 
The Impact of Financial Liberalization and the Rise of Financial Rents on Income 
Inequality: The Case of Turkey
Page 30 of 39
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Bilkent 
University Library; date: 13 December 2018
However, the tax burden on the incomes of the corporate 
sector had reached a maximum of only 1.7 per cent over the 
same period.
It can be seen that capital incomes effectively remain untaxed 
in Turkey, and as the treasury offered sizable premiums on the 
market yields of its instruments, it became  (p.370)
the 
dominant agent in the financial economy, enabling the banking 
system to capture significant returns based on the arbitrage of 
open positions. Consequently, the current mode of domestic debt 
management through securitization works as a direct income 
transfer to the commercial banking sector and the rentier classes, 
with the state playing an active role in regulating this transfer.
The distribution of the government debt instruments shows 
that in early 1997 more than 92 per cent of the newly 
securitized deficit was purchased by the banking sector, with 
the private and public sectors absorbing respectively another 
4 and 3 per cent each. Thus, the so-called ‘deepening’ of the 
financial system in the Turkish economy has turned into a 
process of self-fuelled cycles ready to burst. High real interest 
rates on the GDIs attract speculative short-term funds, and, 
through the operations of the banking system, these are 
channelled to the vaults of the treasury. In this manner, the 
latter was able to bypass the regulations of the central bank, 
as well as the limits imposed on foreign borrowing. Capital 
account liberalization has, thus, served the government by 
enabling banks to engage in extremely profitable short-term 
borrowing abroad so as to finance the treasury's bond 
Figure 14.2.  Interest payments on 
domestic debt and corporate tax 
revenues (percentage of GNP)
Source : Monthly Statistics (various).
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auctions. The major brunt of the costs of this fragile 
environment, however, has fallen on the productive sphere of 
the economy, especially the traded sector.
Indeed, throughout the course of these operations, Turkey's 
banking sector and financial institutions disengaged from 
investing in production and became the dominant player in 
manipulating the overall economy. Initially, it was the collapse 
in public revenue which led to feverish public sector 
borrowing. The consequent high interest rates on government 
bonds and Treasury bills set the course for the dominance of 
finance over the real economy. As a result, the economy is now 
trapped in a vicious circle: commitment to high interest rates 
and cheap foreign currency (overvalued TL) against the threat 
of capital flight leads to further increases in real interest rates. 
When  (p.371) the adverse impacts on the current account 
balance become excessively destabilizing, real depreciation 
seems imminent, which, however, needs to be matched by 
further upward adjustment in the interest rate if currency 
substitution or capital flight is to be restrained. This process, 
as in the case of Mexico in 1994 and the recent crises in East 
Asia (on this, see Chapter 7 ), leads to overvaluation of the 
domestic currency and the cheapening of imports and, thus, to 
an acceleration of domestic consumption demand at the 
expense of exports and the real productive industries in 
general.
Erratic movements in the current account, a rising trade 
deficit (from 3.5 per cent of GNP in 1985–8 to 6 per cent in 
1990–3) and a drastic deterioration in fiscal balances reveal 
the unsustainable character of the post-1989 populism 
financed by foreign capital inflows. In the words of Boratav et 
al . ( 1995 ):
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the post-1990 Turkish experience shows the serious 
problems confronting a developing economy which 
decides to move into full external and internal 
deregulation in the financial system under conditions of 
high inflation. The specter of capital flight becomes the 
dominant motive in policy-making and creates 
commitment to high interest rates and expectations for 
cheap foreign exchange. The links of these two policy 
variables with the real sphere of the economy, i.e. 
investment on physical capital and the current account 
balance of payments, are deeply severed. Instability in 
the rates of foreign exchange and interest rates creates 
feedbacks which lead the economy into further 
instability.
This prolonged instability reached its climax during the fourth 
quarter of 1993, when currency appreciation and the 
consequent current account deficits rose to unprecedented 
levels. With the sudden drainage of short-term funds in the 
beginning of January 1994, production capacity contracted, 
followed by a continued fall in industrial output throughout 
that year. Together with this contraction, post-1994 crisis 
management gave rise to significant shifts in income 
distribution and to an intensification of the ongoing process of 
the transfer of the economic surplus towards the financial 
sector and away from wage labour and the industrial sectors. 
Likewise, dollar-denominated wage costs decreased 
substantially and enabled export earnings to rise. In this 
manner, Turkey switched once again to a mode of surplus 
extraction, whereby the export performance of industrial 
sectors and the burden of macroeconomic adjustment 
depended on savings on the wage bill. In fact, the 
disequilibrium could only have been accommodated by the 
massive (downward) flexibility displayed in real remunerations 
of wage labour.
As an overall summary of the dynamics of the post-financial 
liberalization, Fig. 14.3 characterizes schematically the main 
mechanisms of macroeconomic regulation in Turkey. Low 
savings, along with a large fiscal gap, and structural 
deficiencies in an oligopolistic production structure set the 
scene portrayed in Fig. 14.3 . Low savings generation results 
directly in disequilibrium in the macroeconomic environment 
along channel (1). An important addition to the features of the 
period was the wage explosion and the re-emergence of a 
The Impact of Financial Liberalization and the Rise of Financial Rents on Income 
Inequality: The Case of Turkey
Page 33 of 39
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Bilkent 
University Library; date: 13 December 2018
populist stance within the background of intensified political 
struggle. In response to these structural characteristics, we 
observe that the state assumed an active role in the economic 
sphere, regulating the distribution of national output.
 (p.372)
 (p.373) The 
state carried 










intermediate, wage, and capital goods produced by state 
enterprises (Fig. 14.3 , box 3). Second, following the full 
deregulation of the capital account, the state actively 
participated in domestic asset markets through the issuance of 
debt instruments (channels 6 and 7). This, together with the 
threat of currency substitution in the context of a convertible 
currency regime, necessitated high interest rates (channels 8a 
and 8b)—the first vicious circle—and real appreciation 
(channel 9b). The second vicious circle surrounding channels 
(9a), (9b), and (9c) is highlighted by the contradictory 
implications of the three variables involved: short-term capital 
inflows (hot money), real appreciation, and high real interest 
rates. Real appreciation was the prime cause of the rise in 
import volumes and the current account deficits. On the other 
hand, real appreciation had a direct positive effect on 
investment demand by reducing the costs of imported capital 
goods and intermediates (channel 13b). This positive effect 
was countervailed by the pressures of real interest rates 
(channel 13a), the result being increased volatility in 
investment demand. High interest rates gave way to 
inflationary pressures through the increased costs of credit 
(channels 8b and 13) and fed a speculative rentier type of 
accumulation (channel 12), with the consequent worsening in 
income distribution. The limits of this bonanza of a short-term 
Figure 14.3.  Macroeconomic dynamics of 
the Turkish economy under full financial 
liberalization (post-1989)
The Impact of Financial Liberalization and the Rise of Financial Rents on Income 
Inequality: The Case of Turkey
Page 34 of 39
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Bilkent 
University Library; date: 13 December 2018
foreign capital-led growth pattern was the eruption of the 
financial crisis in 1994 and the continued fragility and the 
severe disequilibria faced by domestic markets in the late 
1990s.
Clearly, the reform fatigue and exhaustion of the 1988 crisis 
and the unsustainability of the post-1989 growth path which 
culminated in the crisis in 1994 and the current crises have 
been characterized by the operation of quite different macro 
dynamics. Throughout all these episodes, however, in spite of 
the official stance towards a policy of ‘reducing the economic 
role of the state’, we observe continued use of the state's 
powers as a regulatory agent, overseeing the distributional 
conflict over the national product.
14.5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND OVERALL 
ASSESSMENT
This chapter has attempted to investigate and assess the 
impact of financial liberalization and the ongoing rise of 
financial rents on income distribution in the post-1980 Turkish 
economy. The data on the size distribution of income and on 
the long-run dynamics of real wages against labour 
productivity disclose a worsening in income distribution. They 
also disclose an overall disengagement of financial institutions 
from the productive sphere to become the dominant agent in 
the manipulation of the domestic economy. As financial capital 
gained supremacy over industry, the links between growth and 
productivity gains and the channelling of savings to the 
accumulation of productive capital were severely hampered, 
with adverse consequences for wage incomes and the working 
poor. These findings are in stark contrast with the predictions 
of the standard theory which argues that the expected 
productivity gains associated with increased liberalization and 
competition in global commodity and financial markets would 
translate into increased wages within the labour-intensive 
sectors in which Turkey was said to hold comparative 
advantage. Our findings thus underscore that, given the poor 
vertical integration among industrial sectors typical of 
peripheral  (p.374) capitalism, the implementation of 
vigorous export promotion polices and state-led price 
incentives created sporadic increases in productivity in the 
1980s, but failed to generate a sustained increase in economic 
growth and accumulation.
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The Turkish adjustment experience throughout the post-1980 
period has been a process in which, in a developing market 
economy trapped by the needs of its domestic industry to 
integrate into the world markets and the distributional 
requirements warranted by this reorientation, the state 
apparatus became a bastion of privilege, regulating income 
redistribution within society. The elements of this 
redistribution involved direct mechanisms to subsidize 
production and exports, currency depreciation, and wage 
suppression, as well as indirect mechanisms such as tax 
evasion on capital incomes and a financial market 
development strategy that enabled massive income transfers 
to the rentier class.
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Notes:
( 1) See, for example, the contributions by Milanovic ( 1999 ), 
Cornia and Kiiski ( 1999 ), Barro ( 1999 ), Rodrik ( 1997 , 
1998 ), and Atkinson ( 1998a ,b ). See also the 1998, volume 8 
issue of The Economic Journal for a compilation of the 
theoretical mechanics of income distribution and technological 
change.
( 2) This financial assistance represented a resource transfer 
of 4.7 per cent of GDP in 1980. During 1978–80, Turkey alone 
accounted for nearly 70 per cent of the total volume of debt 
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rescheduled internationally among all developing countries 
(Celasun and Rodrik 1989 ). See also Ekinci ( 1998 ) for the 
role of foreign financial assistance in the shaping of the 
post-1980 adjustments in Turkey.
( 3) See Voyvoda and Yeldan ( 1999 ), Onaran ( 1999 ), Tansel (
1999 ), Boratav et al . ( 1996 ), Yeldan ( 1995 ), Uygur ( 1993 ), 
Senses ( 1994 ), Boratav and Türel ( 1993 ), Celasun ( 1994 ), 
and Ozmucur ( 1986 ) for analyses of the adjustment patterns 
and distributional shifts under the Turkish structural 
adjustment reforms of the 1980s.
( 4) See Boratav ( 1991 ) for narrative support for this claim.
( 5) See, for example, Köse and Yeldan ( 1998 ), Yeldan (
1996a , 1997 ), and Boratav et al . ( 2000 ) for a more 
comprehensive assessment of this argument. Yeldan ( 1996b , 
1998 ), in turn, offers a macroeconomic general equilibrium 
assessment of the pre-1994 crisis path of the Turkish economy 
and reports that the fiscal deficits realized between 1991 and 
1993 enabled an increase in the real incomes of private 
industrial capital by as much as 7 per cent per annum.
( 6) Data on these indicators can be obtained from the website 
of the treasury undersecretariat, http://www.treasury.gov.tr .
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